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Cross-border Banking - The Road AJread and
Lessons from Emerging Markets in Europe
Daztid Nellor and Gonzalo Salinas'
I.

Introduction

'T
a.
\
I
I \

igeria's financial sector has flourished in recent yeats offering the potential to be

a key driver

of

economic development in Nigeria as well as throughout the

,.gion. Th. changes have been dramatic. Banking sector assets have grown

from 30 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2005 to about 65 percent of GDP at
end- 2008 and Nigerian banks operate in 35 countries compated to just four in the middle

the decade. These are encouraging developments. Yet, the development potential

growing banking sector will be realized only

if

of

of
the

financial stability is preserved. More

specifically, the regulatory framewotk must keep pace with the burgeoning banking sector.
Thus, plans for more tapid implementation

of consolidated

and sub-based supervision arc

underway.

The basic principles

of

regulation and supervision ate well known; the complexity

of

rmplementing those principles soars when cross-border activity grows. Cross-border
banking involves foreign financial institutions opetating in Nigeria on the one hand and

Nigerian banks operating in other jurisdictions, and interaction

of

foreign banks with

Nigerian banks. When Enancial activity crosses borders, monitoring the strength

of

the

Nigerian financial system becomes more complex. Fundamental tasks such as defining
adequate levels

of provisioning or exposure to risk

are considerably more complex for

Nigedan supervisots.

The experience

of emerging markets in Europe is a good starting point for drawing

lessons

on the implications of cross-border banking. Europe and sub-Saharan Africa are both
comprised

of

a large number

of relatively well-integrated countrie s. The significant degree

Messrs David Nellot and Gonzalo Salinas are staff of the Intematioflal Monetary Fufld, Nigeria. The views expressed in
this paper are those of the authom and do not necessadly reptesent the views of the institution to which they arc affiliated
to or its policies.
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across-borders fosters cross-border financial activity. Moreover,

Europe and sub-Saharan Aficz

xe

developing market-based

institutions from limited foundations. In many cases, countries in both regions had relied on

of

economic activity and, in recent )€ars, have been seeking to create
favorable environment for private economic actr!'rq.

direct control

a

This paper focuses on the regulatory and supervisory challenges posed by the growth of
cross-botder banking, drawing lessons from the emerging markets in Europe. The second
section takes stock

of cross-border banking activity in emerging European and sub-Saharan

African markets. The third section examines the experience of emerging markets in Europe
to identi$, the challenges that have arisen as financial integration grows. The fourth section

looks at the regulatory response to cross-border activiq'and draws lessons about what
worked and what failed. The global financial crisis was

framework and helps identi$r weaknesses

tlat

a

major sress test for the regulatory

need to be addressed in the regulatory

framework. The fifth section examines recent proposals to strengthen the regulatory and
supervisory architecture. Finally, the paper highlights the lessons that authorities in subSaharanAfrica, and Nigeria, in particulat, could draw from European experience.

II.

Cross-border Banking - The State of Play
The changes in the European and African banking systems have been significant and rapid.
Regional financial integration has proceefdlfaster in Europe than in other world regions.'
Analysis is underway on assessing Enancial integration in sub-Saharan Africa and while it has

been significant,

it lags that in emerging Europe. The implications of the rapid financial

integration ate prominent on the policy agenda in sub-Saharan Africa owing particulady to
the rapid increase in activity

of South African

and Nigerian banks across the continent.

Large cross-border banks are gaining a substantial market share in emerging Europe. Sixteen

large cross-border financial institutions account for about one third

banking assets, hold an average

of

38 percent

of their banking

of European Union

assets outside their home

' See De Nicold and Ivaschenko (2008) who measure the advances in Errancial integretion as a degtee of ctoss country
coovergence in equity premiums following the methodology developed by Adiaout€ and Danthine (2004).
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thd othet European Union countries.' European banking

integration is gainiflg momentum in terms of cross-border flows, market share of foreign
banks in several markets, and cross-border mergers and acquisitions are on the inctease.'

The bulk

of their ctoss-border

business is in wholesale markets, which are now relatively

well integrated, particularly interbank and corporate bond markets. Integration at the retail
level is limited, accounting for about 5.0 per

In

centof activity.o

Africa, cross-border banking activity involving Nigeria has become
significant in the last few years. Major foreign financial groups have traditionally held a
sub-Saharan

significant ptesence in Nigeria through direct ownership in or involvement with Nigerian
banks, and in recent years Nigerian banks have considetably expanded their opemtions in
other countries.

o

Citibank, Standard Chartered, and Standard Bank have sizeable operations in

Nigeria. Foreign ownership

of

banks may increase as new investors

seek

participation in the on-going resttucturing of the banking sy,stem.
a

Nigerian banks operate in 29 counties in Africa, and in 6 countries outside the

continent (Iable 1). Most large Nigerian banks opetate offshore. Ecobank and
United Bank for Africa each have activities in more than 20 countries.

See mapping exacist of European Union baaking groups cerried out by thc Banking Supervision Committee
European Sptem of Centraf B.o[s Cfrichet, 2007).
'Schoenmakcr and Oostcrloo (2005) end Dermioc (2005).
'CihiL and Dccressin (2007) and Dierick er d. (200?).
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Tabte 1. Nigerian Banks Operating in Other Jurisdictions

Bank

Subsidiaries

Non Subsidiary or Unspecifed

Access Bank

The Gambia, C6te dlvoire ,
Democratic Republic of Congo,

Sicrra Lcone (hcad ofiicc aod onc
branch), Uniad Kingdom (head

Rwanda, Zambia,

Bttundi

office and one branch)

Afribank
Itank PI

Ill

Ireland (offshore firume ofice)

The Gambia, Ghana, Iibetia,
Sierra

IrcoBank

lrone, Uganda

Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cape Verde, Cameroun, Ccntral

Aftican Republic, Chad, China,
Corgo Btazzavile, Democraric
Republic of Congo, C6te dTvoire,
Francc, Gabon, The C'ambia,
Ghana, Guinca, Guinea Bissar4

Kenta, libcria, IIalawi, N1ali,
Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome &
Principe, Seoegal Sierra Leone,

T,€.,

Lrganda, U nited Arab
Emirates, United Kingdom,
Ztmbia

I;irst Bank

France, United Kingdom

Guaranty

Thc Gambia, Ghana,

Trust Bank

Sicrra

Intercontinental

Libcria,

kone.

Ghana, United Kingdom

Bank

(}meroun, The Gambia, Ghana

Oceanic Rank

Sao

Uni<n Bank

Bcnin, Ghana, Unitcd Kingdom

of Nigeria
United Bank

Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi,

for Africa

Carneroon, Chad, C<ite d'Ivoire,
Gaboq Ghana, Guirc4 Republic
C-ongo, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Kenv4 fibe ria, I\hli,
Rwan&, Senqgl, Sierra Ie one,

of

'faozani4 Uganda,

Zambin,

France, Unired Kingdom, Unitcd
States.

Zenith Baok

Tonr

Ghana, Siera Irore, South Africa,
United Kingdom

Source Vebsitcs of Ixnks lisled ifl the first cdumrl
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foreign banks with Nigerian banks has increased coflsiderably

following the consolidation of the banking system at end-December 2005. This has
included loan placements u/ith Nigerian banks and, more generally, through credit
lines. The scale

of this involvement

is

difficult to measure, but the rapid growth in

several indicators such as foteign claims on Nigerian banks, Nigerian banks total
capital, value

of ttade in Nigerian debt, and capital mising byNigerian banks, reflect

to a large extent the increasing involvement
Figor.

v.ru.

or

of foreign

banks in Nigeria.

I

I..d... r. xh.rhn o.br

(. rion..ru.r.

d.rLn

I
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The payoff from regional financial integration can be significant. Integntion can make
financial markets motb efficient, reduce economic volatility, and promote economic
growth. The payoff is in:5

o

Mar*tt

access

and competition increased matket access can deliver efficiency gains by

unleashing competitive pressutes through contestabiJity or direct competition.

c

Marktt

scale and

shututre.'tntegrating ftagmented markets creates a deeper and more

liquid market Pooling liquidity fosters trading opportunities, lowers margins or bid-

ask spreads ot risk spread, limits the volatility impact
conttibutes to more efficient ptice formation.

' Sec Dccrcssin et d (2007) and Tobint (1984) conccps of ef6ciency in Enancial matkes.

of

large trades, and
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filancial integration boosts innovation through new

financial instruments that promote mote cost efficient hedging of risks.o
Cross-border activity can smoothen incomes through cross-bordet asset diversification and

contribute to economic stability in the face of asymmetric shocks.- Estimates for European
countries show that risk sharing has increased significandy since 1999. In the United States,

it

is estimated that two-fifths

of

the income effect fiom local shocks is smoothed away

through asset holdings across state lines. The extent to which financial integration is able to
insure incomes against country-specific shocks, however, is still limited and is uneven actoss

European regions.'

More effective adjusmrent to shocks makes the financial system resilient and allows for

more efficient resource allocation. In addition, improved risk-adjusted growth
opportunities appear to be related to future advances in integration. This empirical
observation suggests that the countries, whose integration has been faster, benefit most

from

a

virtuous dynamic in which financial integration and improved real prospects are

mutually reinforcing. Indeed, the fastet financial integration
associated with higher subsequent risk-adiusted

III.

in Europe is statistically

growth.'

SupervisotyandRegulatotyChallengesfromCross-borderActivity

Ctoss-border activity makes regulation and supervision more challenging Supervisors face
greater uncertainty about the magnitude and location

of

risks because

of

the increasingly

complex Iinkages across market segments and borders that make the ftansmission
economic shocks and the pattern

of

of risk dispersion difficult to track. In addition, the

difficulry of coordinating national supervisory agencies, whose fiduciary responsibi-lities are

toward national governments, limits their effectiveness in working tov/ard commofl
objectives in the design and implementation of financial regulations "'
'

lnvolvemcnt of foreign baoks can briog dwelopment gains through tcchnology uatrsfer and human capiul dcvelopment.

'rMF

(2008).

IMF (2008), in Eutope, less than one-tenth of the income effect from a countryJevel
shock is smoothed away through factor income flows across otler Europcafl coudtries
' See De Nicold and Ivaschenko (2008). The speed of integstion is m€asuted by the gap between a country's cost of ceftal
from dre regional (or other group) avetage. The grc,vth opportunities are adiusted for risk and erc proxied by the atio of
market price-to-earniags ratios to thet volatility.
" rMF (2008).
' According to estimates preseoted in

t7t
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The regulatory ftarnework needs to minimize the negative consequences of financial
integration. The main risks of financial integration are:"
c
Contagion: incteased likeLihood of adverse external ot spillover effects transmitted
across financial markets beyond what fundamental linkages would ptedict.

a

Fundamental spillowrc tncreased

likelihood

of the wider

disturbances through market relationships, transactions,

spread

of

financial

or exPosutes, reflecting

Iinkages between various entities and matkets. Significant financial cross-border
spillovers have the potential to amplifr the macroeconomic effects

of

leverage pro-

cyclicality.'' An increase in the pro-cyclicality

of

lending behavior might boost

investrnent and output volati.Iity in the presence

of

financial cross-border spillovers

than it would do in their absence.

Transition zi,€: encompasses elements

of

the preceding factors and concerns tlte

specific risks arising from changes in integtation. In Europe, this risk is particulady
germane for countries that experience a sharp fall in interest rates and pronounced

credit booms dudng convergence accompanying European Union or Euro atea
membetship. Some

of

these risks are present

in Nigeria and other developing

countdes that are integrating into global financial markets."

Cross-border ownership is a major transmission channel

of financial

sector risk. Integration

increases possibilities for stronger balance sheet linkages and exposutes. As

in the market

valuation

of

financial firms

in

a

result, changes

one location can have cross-border

tepercussions. Moreover, ownership links often lead to concentration in off-balance sheet
exposures, such

rr

as

intergroup credit and guatantees.

Faruqee (2007).
'' Galessi and Sghcrri (2009).
" In Nigeria, for example, the 6scal and banking tefotms in thc middle of the decade tesulted io both dcoand ead supply
side pressures on macro€conomic management end Enancid stxbili+ Merkets positively re-rated Nig€ria and, ,loog with
global ptessues on investors seeking returns, saw an incteased supply of 6.rnds flowing to Nigeria and its bants The
increased flow of capital to Nigerian banks is reflected on sevetal indicators shown in Figute 1. Nigcriao baols wete
Iooking to increase their balence sheets to secure martet share.
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Lessons from Regulatory Arrangements - What Worked and What Failed
Most financial sector regulatory and supervisory activities in Europe are organized on

a

national basis. For the banking sector, each country is responsible for the consolidated
supervision of institutions domiciled in that country fot which it is the home supervisor.
also has the responsibiliry; as host supervisor, to oversee subsidiaries

It

of institutions from

other member states opetating in its jurisdiction. Several authorities have commitments to
coopemte with counterparts abroad expressed in national laws ot their mission statements.

Nonetheless, fiaancial ovetsight has been moving towards the European-wide level since the

late 1970s. A series

of

directives and other instruments created a binding framework for

national prudential regulation across the European Union, and new member states are
obliged to accept these rules. Since the 1990s, various initiatives, including the Lamfalussy
Process, have aimed to strengthen further Europeafl financial integration.

The main structure for tegulation and supervision at the European level is set out in the
Lamfalussy Process. This process is a framework designed to facllitate coopetation among
national supervisors.'4 The process

!

L,eael

is

defined by four levels:

1: the framework legislation setting out the core principles and defining

implementing powers.
I:ael 2: the techntcal details that are formally adopted by the European Commission.

3: adisory committees to the European Commission established for the
banking, insurance, and securities sectots committees intended to facil.itate

l-zuel

exchange

a

l-zuel

of information, cooperation

and convergence

of supervisory ptactices.

4: dte timety and correct transposition of EU legislation into

national

law.Within that framewotk, ctoss-border issues are addressed by loose collaborative
arrangements:rt
" tih6k aod Decressin
" Ueray IZOOO;..

(200?)
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A number of bilateral and some multilateral
Memoranda of Undetstanding commit the signatories to regular exchange of
Information excharge and conmltalzbr

infotmation and timely consultation on enfotcement action.
'Colhges" of sQeruinrs The colleges

follow the activities of cross-border insurance

groups and some banks. Colleges arc not, howeve! in operation in all countries.

L,ini*d EnEe-rrifu powers:Bwropean Union institutions have powets in three

areas:

agreed reguladons that are direcdy applicable in all Member States; the Council

of

the European Union discusses Frnancial sector policy; and the European Union
Commission has autonomous powets in ateas relating to the completion

of

the

common market, competition and rade negotiations, including uade in services.

a

l-mdtr-of-kst resort at regional htel: The European Centtal Bank @,CB) and the
European System of Central Banks @,SCB) are lenders of last resort. Each national

central bank

is responsible for

emergency liquidity

to

financial institutions

domiciled in its iurisdiction with the ESCB and ECB informed in case offsetting
monetary action is needed.

The increasing integration

of

European banking systems was a factor determining the

impact of the global financial crisis. Countries with larger bank-related capital inflows

were

affected.'u As parent banks experienced increasing tiquidity tighmess, financial markets
reacted adversely to their Eastern European subsidiaries.

A sudden interruption in loans

from foreign parent banks to subsidiaries had an adverse impact on credit and economic

gro'*th as.well as placing pfessure on exchange rates and resefves. Exchange rate
movements etoded credit quality due to the eistence of large-scale foreign currenry
mismatches in the private sector in much

of emetging Eutope.

In the run up to the crisis, lending was higher on account of weak supervisory capacity on
cross-border lending. The lending financed largely activities in the non-tradable sectori and

" rMF

(2009).

6
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the economies. Apart from currency mismatches and

debt toll over needs, the emerging European economies that tackled ovetheating more
e

ffectively were less affected by the crisis.

The failure to build sufficient reserves for loan losses during the pre-crisis boom
undermined many banks

in

emerging Eutope even though they had appeared well

capitalized and profitable." These banks were generally in compliance with basic micro
prudential regulations, but, with the benefit of hindsight, should have gone well above the
required minimums to maintain sufficient capital during the financial crisis. Furthermore,
Eastern European supervisors did not impose tough provisioning and capital tequirements

on foreign-owned banks due to possible inconsistencies with Basel II preparations and
tfusting the effectiveness of supervision in source countries. Moreover, there is the
suggestion that there was concern about possible retaliation by parent banks. This was a

ma)or problem in Eastern Europe, probably more than other regions, given the large
participation of foreign banks.
Regulatoty weaknesses exposed during tl-re financial crisis srengthened arguments for

more cohesive system

of

6nancial regulation

in the European Union.

a

Decentralized

supervisoty frameworks and accounability for financial stability, hinder ctoss-banking

operations and the capacity

to

effectively and efficiendy superyise latge financial

institutions. The crisis exposed seveml weaknesses:

"

Reliance on consensts slon ed fucision-naleing Consensus

decision making impeded

progress on the regulatory framework and it increasingly fell behind developments
in the rapidly changing financial sector.

Decision making shact*res yere domirated @ rutiorul ratber tbafi regiofi-n ide interestf

The

committees may be biased tov/ards outcome s that favot established interests that
ate effective in lobbying at a national level, mther than maximize welfare for Europe

" rl"{F (2009).
" Cih6* 8d DecrEssin (2007)
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awhole. Committee decisions maybe achieved by recognizing all current national

practices, thus hindering integration and adding to the regulatory burden.

Dnedraliqed dedsion making cannot trark mlnerabilities. The costs

of decentralization

mounted as financial institutions and markets become mote integtated; national
authorities individually cou.ld no longer exercise effective supervision

of

cross-

border groups. Information was dispersed and aspnmery among the supervisory
bodies both at the macroeconomic and the microeconomic levels.

Rqtlatory arbitragr. Finzncizl institutions faced twenty seven diffetent prudential
regimes.

The lackof cohesiveness of the tegulatory ftamework in Europe is the main message of the
de Larosidre

enforcement

report." The significant leeway provided to European Union members in the

of

common directives is the main cause of lack

directives too often left, as a political choice, a range

"kvel

of

cohesion. "Level 1"

of national options, which

3" committees to impose different solutions. Even when

a

allowed

directive did not include

national options, it led to diverse interpreations that were not eliminated by region-wide
committees. Examplesof excessive d.ivetsity are:

o

Difered &fritions

fruncial itrstiturtons: Laxer supervision and regulatory arbitrage
resulted from some countries having different definitions regarding the sectoral
of

extent of European Uflion supervision. Some members had an extended definition

of

credit institutions compared with other members uzith much more limited

definitions.

Deftition of

core

capital

dffi'rThtsbasic element of

assessing financial stability vaded

from one counry to another. This hindered the efficiency and enforcement of the
Basel ditective on capital requitements.

Dhefie reponiflg obligations. The

dive

rse reporting obligations weakene

transpatency of the system.
'"

A repon produced by a highJevel group on financial supewision ofthe European Union (EU, 2009).

d

the
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accomtirgpracticer. These differences, such as those concerning provisions

related to pensions, create serious distoftions in the calculation

of prudential funds.

V.

The Way Forward - Theoty and Recent Proposals
The financial crisis increased the urgency of reforming Europe's financial sector. Until
recendy, political preference, as well as legal and institutional considerations, limited
progress on cross-border financial stability arrangements. However,
bank recapitalization efforts in emerging Europe will be wasted

if

it is recognized that

not accompanied by

a

of the supervisory, regulatory, and macro prudential framework. Stticter
capital requirements will need to be accompanied by much stronger cross-border
strengthening

cooperation between home and host central banks, supervisors, and ministries of finance.
Regulatory and supervisory convefgence remains essential to foster smooth and gro$,th-

oriented adiustment among economies characterized by increasingly complex linkages
across market segments and borders. This has been recogtrized and action has been taken

in

this direction.

Implementing

a

unified supervision arrangement in financially integmted countries should

be the goal accotding to theoretical analysis. A unified supervisory framework is superior

to

decenralized supervision in financially integrated regions because:

.

Decedrali<ed regiators ma1 redta regialory standards relatiae to a nnlraliTgd solxtion.

Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2001), show this result in a model in which regulators
concerned with their banking system's stability and efficiency set their regulatory

policy non-coopetatively. Since bank supervision has externalities due to ctossborder spillovers, an independent solution collectively becomes more inefficient
with lugher financial integration.

A tlfied

sxpemisiorframework car prouide tbe bigbut hrel of safe|) ,1,itb tbe

dcposit gtarantees.

kt

est?rouision

of

Hardy and Nieto (2008) studied the optimal design of prudential

supervision and deposit guamfltee regulations

in a

multi-country, integrated

banking market such as the European Union, whete policy-makers have either

similar

or

asymmetric preferdnces regarding profiabiliry and stability

of

banking sector. Under this framework, they conclude that full coordination

the

of
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prudential supervision and deposit guarantees would result in the highest level

of deposit guarantees.

safety and soundness and would involve the lowest provision

Duerhaliqgd srpenision

leads to a disprEortionate distrib*tion

of

of

tbe total costs of

fnancial

Nieto and Schinasi (2007) apply two models of decision making,
concluding that the larger countries in Europe will end up bearing a

srpenision.

disproportionately large share

of

the overall burden

of

allocating resources to

secure financial stabiliry Hence, there may not be a close correspondence across

countries

of the benefits

received and the costs incurred

in contributing to the

financial stability.

Arguments for a unified supervisory system in Euope are sto.rg.

(200! propose

a frrll-fledged European

side national regimes.

iihek and Decressin

Union level prudential regime that operates along-

A European Banking Charter could establish

a level playing

field for

financial sector competition, while closing gaps in Europe's financial stabiJity framework.

Hardy (2009) argues fot the implementation of an effective European mandate. Such an
arrangement would give European Union convergence, cooperation and opemtional weight
at the national level. The mandate would enhance the functioning

of

the

kvel

3 committees

of a more efficient and
effective European stability framework. Looking forward to further integration of
and supervisory colleges as well as facilitate further development

European financial markets and commercial institutions, itis suggested, that an Europeaflwide financial stability mandate would be required.

Europe is, however, taking

a

different path relying on harmonization and cooperation based

on national financial stability ftamewotk rather than a unified system.' Support for
harmonization and adoption of core minimum standards is the foundation of the approach
proposed by the de Latosidre report. Consistency, it is atgued, does not need a unified
system

of

supervision. The report argues that national approaches that benefit some

countries can be implemented without falling into the existing drawbacks

of

national

systems. For instance, allowing a country to adopt safeguatds or regulatory measures stricter
a

Appendix

I-arosiare

I

shows divisioa

repo(

of

supervisory responsibilities between the EU and national level as ptoposed by the de
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than the common framework should not be tejected, as long as agreed minimum core
standards ate harmonized and enforced.

Eliminating regulatory inconsistencies is an essential part of the European approach. Since
the application

of

directives has given too much leeway to national application

of critical

supervision regulations, the de Larositre report suggests that future legislation should be
based on regulations. W4ren directives are used, the implementing agency should strive to

of the cote

achieve maximum harmonization

The central bank will take on the role

issues.

of macro prudential supervisor The de Larosidre

report supports an extended role for the ECB in macro-prudential ovefsight. The central
bank would not be involved in micro-prudential supervision. The report suggests that

micro-supervisory duties could impinge on the centtal bank's fundamental mandate
including the risk of political pressure and interference jeopardizing its independence. In
anv event, micro prudential supervision is extemely complex because in the case
the central bank would have to deal with

A new institution - a European

a

of a crisis

multiplicity of member states.

of

Financial Supervision @SFS) - to enhance
tegional cooperation is proposed. De LarosiBre finds that the regional committees were
System

ineffective in ensuring fiaancial stability in Europe. The proposed ESFS would be an
integrated network

of Eutopean financial

supervisors based on a largely decentralized

structure. Since national supervisors are closest to the institutions they supervise, they
would preserve the majority of their present responsibilities. The supervisor of the home

countrywill continue to function

as the

fitst point of contact, and a European centre should

coordinate the application of common standards, guaranteeing suong interaction among
supervisors, while safeguarding the interests

of host supervisors.

ESFS supervisors should have clear responsibilities, sufficient resources, and a strong
mandate. The report suggests that the ESFS be independent from possible vested interests,
at

both European Union and national levels and neural with tespect to national supervisory

structures. It also expects that the ESFS will work with a common set

of

core harmonized

rules and rely on high-quality and consistent information. In times

of

crisis, the ESFS

Nellor and Salinas: Cross-Border Banking: The Road Ahead and Lessons

should have

179

a strong coordinating role, facilitating cooperation and

exchange

of

information between competent authorities, possibly acting as mediator when needed,
verifring the information that should be available to all parties, and guiding the relevant
authorities in their decision-making.

The ESFS should continue to rely on the colleges of supervisors. Colleges of supervision
should be strengthened by the participation of representatives of the secretariat of the level
3

committees

as

well

as

of ECB/ESCB observers. The reportalso tecommends that Level3

commiftees be transformed into three European Authorities: a European Banking
Authority,

a

European Insurance Authority and

a

European Securities Authority.

Reflecting these views, the European Union Commission adopted in September 2009

ldslative proposals to strengthen financial supervision. This legislation sets up

the

proposed ESFS and provides it with broader competencies compared to existing Europewide institutions. This includes:

o

Con statdardr. Developing proposals for technical standatds fot stronger tegulation

principles.
a

Hanloniqitg mbs

across

cotnlriet Resolving cases

of

disagreement between national

supervisors, where legislation requires them to co-operate of to agree.
Consistent inpbmentation: Contributing
technical Community rules.
lVideniry

tbe regional regalatory

Coordinated rrisis reEan re

to

ensuring consistent application of

tehDirecdy supervising credit rating agencies.

Coordinating action in emergency situations.

The legislation also creates a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), which will issue earlyo
risk warnings.

\II.

Conclusions - Drawing Lessons for sub-Saharan Africa

Ctoss-botder financial sectot activity inherently gives rise to risks to financial stability in one
ormore jurisdictions. This increased risk arises because:

o

t}rere exists no regulatory framework that is targeted

to provide an effective
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regulatory structu(e for cross-border activity;

o
.

of cross-border activity;

the technical complexityof supewision
the growth

of cross-border activity thatis outpacing the development of regulatory

frameworks and supervisory capacity; and

o

the incentive sttuctute
and implementation

All of

of national jurisdictions thatcan result in sub-optimal design

of regulation.

these weaknesses were demonsttated in European emerging markets particulady

during the financial crisis. African regulators and supervisors need to work expeditiously to
address cross-border issues. The experience
need for Africa to initiate prompdy

a

of

emerging markets in Europe higtrlights the

process to design and implement a financial regulatory

framework thatpreserves financial stability in the region in the context of increasing crossborder activity. During the current global crisis, Africa's financial integration may be too

Iimited to generate such a maior economic disruption as has been the case in Eastern
Europe. Despite this, Africa has a burgeoning cross-botder activity, but no formal
framework. The European Union has worked for several decades to enhance the coherence

of its nationally-based system of

financial supervision, and despite accelerated efforts

during this decade with 6:ll involvement of experts ftom its advanced member countries,
the insufficient cohesiveness

of its framework

has amplified the effects

of the intemational

crisis.

In developing

.

a

framework, consideration might be given to:

Defining a political structure on uzhich the integration process will be based. Africa
lacks the structure

of

the European Union that provides Europe with the political

and technical basis to Frnancial integration process. The cu.rfent structure

of Africa-

wide and sub-regional groups will need to be assessed. Decisions will need to be
made on how to build frameworks for sub-regional groupings as well as continent-

wide.

.

Establishing core principles

of

regulation and supervision. These principles could

encompass minimum capital and provision requirements as well as hatmonization

of

basic supervisory rules, definitions and framework. Each country will need to

adopt common definitions of these principles.

o

Designing an opemtional structure

of cross-botder financial integration. Although

l8l

Nellor and Salinas: Cross-Border Banking: The Road Ahead and Lessons
several commentators on the Europe,rn process proposed the adoption

of a unified

for financial oversight, Africa will need to start by strengthening the
coordination of existing regulators. While the eistence of sub-region-wide
supervisors is essential to facilitate the process, the design of this structure should
define responsibilities in terms of macro and micto ptudential supervisions, It
framevzork

could also establ.ish flexible working groups, similar to supervisory colleges in the

European Union,

to more pragmatically

Through these "colleges" it could establish

address specific cross-border issues.
a

mechanism of peer monitoring

definition and adoption of these core principles
that provide regulat and crisis-related lines
gains at the region-wide level

of

as

of the

well as operational mechanisms

communication. Efforts to tdget

will be essential to avoid the flarrolver interests of

individual members leading to weaket outcomes.
Success in establishing an effective ctoss-botdet tegulatory and supervisory framework

enable the financial sector to become a driver

Africa.

of growth

will

and development in sub-Sahatan
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1

Recornmendations of the De Larosiire Report

Allocation of Competencies Between National and Regional Aurhorities

NATIONAL

SUPERVISORY TASKS

EU I-I]VEL

LE\'EL
of

fit and propcr

tcst,

x

capital

x

Review of baok's interoal capital

assessment

\

aod supervison review

of

Liccnsing

lyanks, c.g.,

busioess plao, aod mioimum capital.

Compliance

with CRD mioimat

re<luirements (?illar

x

l)
process

bank's

adequacv of capita) @illar 2)

x

C)o-site inspectioos

x

fra-ew"rk (PilL

Review of baoks' ,lisclmure

x

3)

\

Eolirrcemeot and sanctioos
I

x

ntcrnal govcrnancc/control

Supcrvison asscssrncnts

of mcrgcrs

x

and

acquisitions,

x
(pan-EU, in
combination with
national asscssmcots)

x

Flybrid funds, i.c., compliancc with cligibility
rc<luircmcnts

x
x
x

Largc cxpnsurcs rcquircmcnts

Quali6cd holding's
Rcporting

(fo

be iocluded io an

EU database)

Koo*

y'our cust<>me r rules

Pr<>visioniog policy

x
x
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NATIONAL

SUPERVISORY TASKS

EU LEVEL

LEVEL
Provisioning policy

x

Anti-money

launde ring rules

x

lmposition

of a crnscrvator and possiblc

x

rcvocation of Iiccnscs

Dcvclopmcnt and implcmcntation ol
harmonizcd rcchnical EU

prudcntial

rcg,ulations and rcquircmcns, including advicc

to thc (lommission

x

x
(incl. binding tcchnical
intcrp rcation of lcvcl
and lcvcl 2 mcasucs)

Eosure c<xrsistent sulxrvision, e.g., defining

x
x

common sulxrvisory sandards and practices

(ird. biodiog

Defi ning overall supervisory grlicies

as

well as arrangements for the functioning of

supervisorl staodards)

colleges

Binding medhtioo, e.g., io
disagreement between

1

na tio n

case of

x

al supervivrrs

Designatioo of group supervGor

x
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(continued)

SUPERVISORY TASKS
Complaints

NATIONAL
LEVEL

EU LEVEL

x

x
(e

g.,

on

discrimination by

oational s upcrvisors)
Financial stability monitoring

x

Binding cooperation aod information sharing

x

procedures

with the ESRC for

macro-

surveillance

x

Evaluate supervisory processes though peer
review

Agyegtc all rclevant information

x

pcrtaining

to cross-bor&r institutions

Prepare and/or adopt

of third

x

counfty

equivaleoce decisions

Represent

EU

interess

in

bilateral

x

and

multilatcral discussions with third couotries on
supervision
Crisis manag,cment

x

x
(Ccnrdinate national
efforts, c.g., crcate and
lead groups

of oational

supervisors)
Crisis resolutioo

x

x

(C<xrrdinate national

efforts, e.g., facilitate

coopclation and exchangc
of information, act

as

mcdiator and help to
de

6nc and implement thc

right dccisions)
Sourcc: Duropcan Uoion @009)

